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 THE DUTY TO CHARGE IN POLICE USE OF 
EXCESSIVE FORCE CASES 
REBECCA ROIPHE* 
ABSTRACT 
Responding to the problems of mass incarceration, racial disparities in justice, 
and wrongful convictions, scholars have focused on prosecutorial overcharging. 
They have, however, neglected to address underchargingthe failure to charge in 
entire classes of cases. Undercharging can similarly undermine the efficacy and 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system. While few have focused on this question in 
the domestic criminal law context, international law scholars have long recognized 
the social and structural cost for nascent democratic states when they fail to charge 
those responsible for the prior regime’s human rights abuses. This sort of impunity 
threatens the rule of law and misses the opportunity to reinforce important 
democratic values. This Article draws on international law scholarship to argue that 
there is a duty to investigate and a limited duty to charge crimes that implicate core 
democratic principles of equality and fairness. Police use of excessive force against 
unarmed African-American suspects is just this sort of crime. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States is in the midst of what seems like an epidemic of police 
shootings of unarmed black men. Cell phone videos made by bystanders or friends 
of the victims animate the injustice. Black Lives Matter activists have mobilized the 
resulting anger into a powerful social movement. Amidst all of this unrest, very few 
of  the  involved  police  officers  have  been  prosecuted.1   Even  fewer  have  been 
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. J.D. Harvard Law School, Ph.D. University 
of Chicago. I would like to thank Professor Ruti Teitel, whose scholarship inspired this paper. 
Many thanks as well to the participants in the Symposium at Cleveland-Marshall College of 
Law for their thoughtful comments. 
1    One notable exception is a case in Charleston, which led to federal charges against the 
officer for shooting an unarmed black man in the back. Chris Dixon & Tamar Lewin, South 
Carolina Officer Faces Federal Charges in Fatal Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/12/us/south-carolina-officer-faces-federal-charges-in-fatal- 
shooting.html. 
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convicted and punished.2 Highlighting the difficulty inherent in these cases, the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has reorganized its inquiry into the killing of Eric 
Garner in Staten Island.3 In 2014, police officers approached Garner and accused 
him of selling loose cigarettes.4 The officers then attempted to arrest Garner for his 
alleged conduct.5 When Garner refused to submit, Officer Daniel Pantaleo used a 
chokehold to subdue him. Garner died after repeating “I can’t breathe” to the officers 
surrounding him.6 The entire incident was caught on video, spurring protests around 
the country. After a Staten Island grand jury refused to indict Pantaleo, the DOJ 
launched an investigation into a potential civil rights violation.7 The investigatory 
team has subsequently split between the  Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
agents and Brooklyn prosecutors—who do not believe charges are appropriate—and 
those within the Civil Rights Division—who disagree.8 
The controversy over the Eric Garner case illustrates both how difficult it is to 
make decisions in these sensitive cases and the relative lack of guidance on when it 
is appropriate, or even necessary, to bring charges. Criminal justice scholars have 
examined and criticized prosecutors’ tendency to overcharge, bringing too many 
charges against too many suspects.9 However, few have looked at the question of 
when, if ever, a prosecutor must charge a case. There is no legal obligation for 
prosecutors to seek indictments, even when the evidence supports a conviction. 
Nevertheless, the question remains whether it would ever constitute an abuse of 
discretion to fail to bring charges. This Article argues that prosecutors must 
investigate and seek to indict in police shooting cases when there is sufficient 
evidence to support charges. It is an abuse of discretion to fail to do so because the 
 
 
2 Three of the officers accused of killing Freddie Gray in Baltimore were acquitted, and 
the charges against the remaining officers were dismissed. Carolyn Sung & Catherine E. 
Shoichet, Freddie Gray Case: Charges Dropped Against Remaining Officers, CNN (July 27, 
2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/27/us/freddie-gray-verdict-baltimore-officers/. 
3    Matt Apuzzo et al., Justice Dept. Shakes up Inquiry into Eric Garner Chokehold Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct.  24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/25/nyregion/justice-dept- 
replaces-investigators-on-eric-garner-case.html. 
4    Id. 
5 Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police- 
chokehold-staten-island.html. 
6    Apuzzo et al., supra note 3. 
7    Id. 
8    Id. 
9 See, e.g., RICHARD L. LIPPKE, THE ETHICS OF PLEA BARGAINING (2012); Kyle Graham, 
Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 704-05 (2014); Bennett L. Gershman, 
Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in the Charging Function, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 
1259, 1279-81 (2011); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable 
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1711 (2010); Richard A. Bierschbach 
& Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L. J. 1743, 1756-61 (2005); Tracey L Meares, 
Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutors’ Discretion and Conduct with Financial 
Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 853-54 (1995); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, 
Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L. J. 1909, 1960-64 (1992); Albert Altschuler, The 
Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 85-105 (1968). 
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crime, which targets a minority group that the criminal justice system has 
historically neglected and abused, implicates basic democratic principles of equality 
and fairness. 
While domestic criminal law scholars have not explored the question of 
undercharging, international law scholars have. As states around the world transition 
to democratic governments, many have debated the question of whether the new 
government has an obligation to prosecute the perpetrators of human rights abuses 
under the previous regime. Drawing on international literature, this Article argues 
that failing to charge a crime implicating fundamental democratic values, such as 
police shootings of unarmed African-American men, is an abuse of prosecutorial 
discretion. The inequality in treatment and racial disparity threaten the legitimacy of 
the system itself. This effect is compounded by the historical treatment of African- 
Americans in criminal courts.10 International law scholars who study transitional 
justice have analyzed how the failure to charge can affect new democracies. Along 
with criminal prosecutions, they have sought alternatives to charging particular 
offenses, such as truth commissions, to reinforce those values without facing the 
practical problems of charging every individual who has committed the crime. 
Drawing on this robust literature, this Article argues that prosecutors have a duty to 
charge the most culpable offenders in police shooting cases and suggests some 
alternative mechanisms to supplement the criminal process when prosecution is 
inappropriate or practical. 
To make this argument, this Article first discusses the law governing 
prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions. Despite efforts to legislate in this area, 
prosecutors retain broad discretion. With the exception of a few instances in select 
jurisdictions, there is no legal duty to charge. Next, this Article reviews classic 
theoretical justifications for prosecution. The Article then looks to international law 
scholarship for principles to guide domestic prosecutorial decision-making. It 
concludes by bringing this all to bear on the question of how to handle the growing 
number of police shootings of unarmed black men. 
This Article concludes that is an abuse of discretion not to charge the most 
culpable police officers, even when the evidence is imperfect or juries are unlikely to 
convict. It is an abuse of discretion not because there is some absolute right to 
accountability, but because the vast under-enforcement, especially in light of the 
historic treatment of African-Americans, undermines the value of equality 
fundamental to our democratic system. It weakens the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system and, with it, democracy itself. Because individual prosecutions will 
not fully address this deficit, we should also turn to alternate mechanisms to 
reinforce the fundamental democratic values of fairness, equality, and transparency 
in the system.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10    See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010); PAUL FINKELMAN, 
RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1992). 
11    The model rule governing prosecutorial conduct is Model Rule of Professional Conduct 
3.8. It imposes limits on when a prosecutor can charge and pursue a prosecution but imposes 
no affirmative obligation. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
506 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:503 
 
 
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
A. Governing Law 
There is no legal or ethical duty to prosecute. In fact, the Rules of Professional 
Conduct focus more on imposing limits on prosecutors’ charging decisions. 
Prosecutors cannot pursue charges that they know are not supported by probable 
cause.12 The explanatory notes to the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct similarly emphasize the prosecutor’s duty to  refrain from 
aggressively seeking convictions by protecting the defendant’s procedural rights and 
ensuring that there is sufficient evidence to convict.13 In other words, the rules of 
professional ethics, like scholars and commentators, attempt to guard against 
overcharging. To that end, the rules articulate professional obligations that restrain 
prosecutors from pursuing convictions with too much zeal. 
The American Bar Association’s criminal justice section also publishes 
unenforceable guidelines or standards for prosecutors. Like the rules, the standards 
instruct prosecutors that their job is not just to pursue convictions and that 
sometimes restraint is in order.14 The standards do urge prosecutors to investigate 
crimes if other agencies fail to do so,15 and they state that prosecutors should not be 
deterred from prosecuting serious crimes by the fact that juries tend to acquit persons 
accused of similar acts.16 By stating these obligations, the bar reminds prosecutors 
that part of their job is to pursue convictions against the guilty despite political 
obstacles and any difficulty in proving their cases. Notwithstanding these few 
reminders, professional standards emphasize obligations to avoid overcharging and 
give little guidance about when, if ever, prosecutors ought to pursue charges.17 They 
state, for example, that prosecutors have broad discretion in determining if charges 
are appropriate18 and need not prosecute a case even when the evidence supports it.19 
The standards, like the rules, warn prosecutors against mindlessly seeking 
convictions.20 The professional guidelines do not establish or even hint at a duty to 
charge or a right of accountability. 
 
 
 
12    Id. 
13    Id. at cmt. 1. 
14    CRIM. JUST. SEC. STANDARDS FOR PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.2(c) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2017). 
15    Id. at Standard 3-3.1(a). 
16    Id. at Standard 3-3.9(e). 
17    See generally id. 
18    Id. at Standard 3-3.4(a). 
19    Id. at Standard 3-3.9(a), (b). 
20    Id. at Standard 3-3.6(c) (urging prosecutors to recommend that the grand jury not indict 
if he or she believes the evidence does not warrant it); see also id. at Standards 3-3.8 (urging 
prosecutors to consider noncriminal disposition in appropriate cases and noting that 
prosecutors should be familiar with social agencies that can divert cases from the criminal 
process), 3-3.9(d) (stating that in making the decision to charge, prosecutors should give no 
weight to personal or political advantage), 3-3.9(f) (stating that prosecutor should not seek 
charges greater than can be supported by the evidence and fairly reflect the crime). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss4/6
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Courts similarly shy away from invitations to regulate prosecutors’ charging 
decisions. In doing so, case law acknowledges that the prosecutor has a quasi- 
judicial role with broad discretion to determine when charges are appropriate.21 In 
State v. Winne, for instance, a New Jersey court dismissed an indictment against a 
prosecutor for failing to charge individuals with illegal gambling.22 Amidst concerns 
about gambling and official corruption, a special prosecutor sought to indict the 
Bergen County District Attorney for failing to prosecute those involved in the 
criminal syndicate.23 The court insisted that such a prosecution for nonfeasance of a 
public duty should only proceed if the state could prove evil motive.24 Otherwise, the 
court reasoned, prosecutors would be fearful in declining to bring charges, which 
constitutes an essential part of their official discretion.25 The court reasoned that a 
prosecutor could choose to commence or drop charges for a number of reasons.26  It 
is the prosecutor’s job to weigh countless factors in determining what justice 
requires.27 Indicting the prosecutor for failing to pursue gambling cases would 
interfere with the administration of justice by injecting a fear of retribution into the 
prosecutors’ determination, which ought to be motivated solely by the interests of 
justice. 
In federal court, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) provides that the 
government can dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint “with leave of the 
court.”28 The Supreme Court declined to decide whether courts could deny 
prosecutors’ uncontested motions to dismiss charges.29 In doing so, it noted that a 
court’s review is primarily designed to protect defendants from harassment, but there 
may also be a limited right to review prosecutors’ decisions  if they are clearly 
contrary  to  the  public  interest.30    Most  jurisdictions  that  have  considered  this 
 
 
21    State v. Winne, 91 A.2d 65, 65 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1952). 
22    Id. 
23    Id. 
24    Id. 
25    Id. at 79. 
26    Id. at 77. 
27    Id. 
28    FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a). 
29    United States v. Gonzales, 58 F.3d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1995). 
30 Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 34 n.15 (1977). Most federal courts similarly 
restrict the courts’ ability to deny the government’s motion to dismiss an indictment to cases 
in which it is clearly in the public interest to do so. See United States v. Smith, 55 F.3d 157, 
159 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the court must grant motions that are not motivated by bad 
faith); United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating that the 
primary purpose of Rule 48(a) is to protect a defendant from “harassment, through a 
prosecutor’s charging, dismissing without having placed a defendant in jeopardy, and 
commencing another prosecution at a different time or place deemed more favorable to the 
prosecution,” but the court can also ask for an explanation of why the dismissal is in the 
public interest). The Seventh Circuit read the rule more narrowly to prohibit courts from 
denying an uncontested motion, even if the court found that the prosecution was acting in bad 
faith. In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Jacobo- 
Zavala, 241 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating courts can only deny a motion to dismiss 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
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particular issue refuse to allow courts to deny uncontested motions for dismissal 
except in extreme cases.31 Like the court in Winne, federal courts recognize that 
prosecutors are better situated to evaluate the propriety of a criminal charge.32 
Separation of powers concerns mandate a narrow review of charging decisions. 
In general, only the elected or appointed prosecutor can decide whether to bring 
charges.33 Some states, however, have statutes allowing private citizens to petition 
courts or other officials to prosecute alleged criminal conduct. Concerned citizens 
used such a law in Ohio to request a grand jury investigation into Officer Timothy 
Loehmann for killing Tamir Rice, a twelve-year old African-American boy, who was 
shot while reaching for a toy gun.34 Several other states provide some mechanism for 
citizens to initiate charges with approval of a court or other government officer,35 but 
 
 
charges if “the government’s motion is contrary to manifest public interest because it is not 
based in the prosecutor’s good faith discharge of her duties”); Gonzalez, 58 F.3d at 462 
(reserving the question of whether the district court can ever deny an uncontested motion and 
noting that if it does, it can only do so in “exceptional circumstances”); United States v. 
Welborn, 849 F.2d 980, 983 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding district courts may deny untested 
motions only “in extremely limited circumstances in extraordinary cases . . . when the 
prosecutor’s actions clearly indicate a betrayal of the public interest”). 
31 United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 515 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, Woodruff v. 
United States,  425 U.S. 971 (1976)  (ruling that  the federal  court in Texas exceeded its 
authority by denying the Government’s dismissal motion because the government had offered 
support for its decision, which was “not clearly contrary to the public interest”). 
32    Winne, 91 A.2d at 72-84. 
33 In Linda R.S. v. Richard D., the Supreme Court held that a mother did not have 
standing to compel a Texas prosecutor to bring charges against her husband for failure to pay 
support for her child who was born out of wedlock. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 
(1973). The mother disagreed with the prosecutor who interpreted the statute to apply only to 
legitimate children. Id. at 614-16. In deciding the case, the Court noted that “a private citizen 
lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Id. at 
619; see also Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 357, 374 (1986) (explaining the history of private prosecution and noting that 
currently, “[c]ourts generally grant the public prosecutor the exclusive power to initiate 
criminal proceedings”). 
34    OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.09(D) (LexisNexis 2017) provides: 
A private citizen having knowledge of the facts who seeks to cause an arrest or 
prosecution under this section may file an affidavit charging the offense committed 
with a reviewing official for the purpose of review to determine if a complaint should 
be filed by the prosecuting attorney or attorney charged by law with the prosecution of 
offenses in the court or before the magistrate. 
This process was adopted in 2006 to replace an older process by which a private citizen could 
charge a crime directly without review by any government official. State v. Mbodji, 951 
N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (Ohio 2011). 
35 GA. CODE § 17-4-40(b)(1) (2010) (allowing citizen to make a request for criminal 
process to begin); IDAHO STAT. tit. 19 § 501 (2016) (allowing citizen to apply to court for an 
arrest warrant); MD. STAT. § 2-607(c)(6) (2015) (allowing citizen to apply to a commissioner 
who may issue a summons or, under limited circumstances, an arrest warrant); MINN. STAT. 
§§ 388.12, 8.01 (2016) (allowing citizens to appear before grand juries, petition district courts, 
appoint special prosecutors, and ask the governor to direct the attorney general to commence 
prosecution.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-304 (2005) (allowing private citizen to seek arrest 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss4/6
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most impose restrictions on private access to the criminal justice process.36 The 
majority of jurisdictions vest discretion entirely with the prosecutor and forbid 
private initiation of criminal charges.37 
The fact that the law largely leaves the charging decision to the prosecutor does 
not end the inquiry. Professional standards govern prosecutors’ decisions, but they 
offer limited guidance about when and whom to charge. Theories of punishment 
provide a starting point for analyzing this question. Prosecutors should start with a 
goal in order to determine who to punish and what sort of penalty to seek. Theories 
about the purpose of criminal penalties also help set the groundwork for 
understanding the limits of punishment in the criminal justice system. While there 
are many variations, the three most important theories of criminal justice for the 
purposes of this Article are retribution, deterrence, and other consequentialist 
theories. 
B. Justification 
Generally, retributive theories of justice rest on the assumption that guilty people 
deserve to be punished.38 The severity of the punishment ought to be proportional to 
 
 
 
 
warrant or summons); S.C. CODE § 22-5-110 (2011) (allowing private citizen to initiate a 
criminal case by requesting a magistrate to issue a summons); VA. STAT. § 19.2-72 (2016) 
(allowing private citizen complaints in writing). In Texas, private citizens can seek indictment 
directly from a grand jury. Douglas E. Baloof, Weighing Crime Victims’ Interests in Judicially 
Crafted Criminal Procedure, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1135, 1142 (2007). 
36 Taliaferro v. Locke, 182 Cal. App. 2d 752, 757 (1960) (rejecting mandamus to compel 
the district attorney to initiate prosecution); State ex rel. Freed v. Cir. Ct. of Martin County, 14 
N.E.2d 910 (Ind. 1938) (nullifying lower court’s order forcing the prosecutor to approve an 
affidavit in support of a criminal charge); Lutz v. Commonwealth, 505 A.2d 1356, 1356-57 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) (denying petition for a writ of mandamus compelling the attorney 
General to investigate and prosecute a District Attorney for fraud). 
37 Smith v. United States, No. 97-10025-PBS, 2013 WL 2154004, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
69778, at *1 (D. Mass. May 15, 2013) (holding that a private citizen cannot file a criminal 
complaint in federal court and there is no right to require the government to initiate criminal 
proceedings); Roberts v. State, 280 Ga. App. 672, 674 (2006) (stating that “neither an accused 
nor a third-party private citizen may prosecute a criminal matter on his or her own”); Santiage 
v. Clerk Mag. of Clinton Dist. Ct., No. 0600397, 2006 WL 2848120, 2006 Mass. Super. 
LEXIS 431, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 2006) (denying a writ of mandamus ordering the 
clerk to accept an application for a criminal complaint); State ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d 
361, 385 (Minn. 1977) (allowing private access to grand juries and district courts to use other 
mechanisms to petition for prosecution but denying the citizen the right to prosecute a crime 
himself); State v. Czartorsky, No. a-4384-07T4, 2009 WL 1228442, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. 
LEXIS 1087, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (holding that a private citizen lacks 
standing to object to a lack of probable cause determination); Seeton v. Adams, 50 A.3d 268, 
269-70 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (holding writ of mandamus cannot be used to correct the 
district attorney’s allegedly mistaken view of a criminal statute); In re Richland County 
Mag.’s Ct., 389 S.C. 408, 414-15 (2010) (holding that a non-lawyer prosecuting a criminal 
misdemeanor charge engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and condemning the 
influence of private interests on public prosecution). 
38 MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 104-88 
(1997); JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 67 (1973). 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
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the severity of the crime.39 In turn, the gravity of the crime rests on the culpability of 
the wrongdoer and the harm to the victim.40 Philosophers have posed retribution as a 
theory for punishment for some time. Immanuel Kant reasoned that retribution was a 
moral imperative.41 More recently, Herbert Morris argued that retribution is justified 
because criminals are essentially free riders.42 They benefit from the fact that 
everyone else in society has agreed not to commit crimes without adhering to that 
agreement themselves.43 Unlike tort law, theories of retribution are concerned not 
with compensating a victim, but with righting a wrong.44 In other words, retributive 
theories insist that punishment is a way of repairing a moral injury.45 
Retributive theories of justice, at least in the absolute sense, support a right to 
accountability. In Morris’ formulation, the victim and the rest of the public who have 
followed the rules have a moral right to see punishment for the person who abused 
the trust.46 If the criminal justice system exists to mete out punishment for crimes, 
then mandatory charging makes sense. It follows, without too many logical steps, 
that if a wrongdoer deserves to be punished, the state has an obligation to do so.47 
The strong retributive theory of justice does not offer much guidance to policy 
makers who face external constraints. It offers little to prosecutors who have limited 
budgets or concerns about the effect that prosecutions might have on the stability of 
the government or the rule of law.48 Some scholars have modified retributivism by 
arguing that anyone guilty of a crime deserves punishment, but the moral duty gives 
way if it would result in some particularly bad result.49  If the negative consequence 
of prosecution passes that threshold, then policy makers and prosecutors would be 
justified in forgoing punishment.50 Others have conceded that retribution is not 
possible for every criminal act,51  but is, on the whole, a social good. Therefore, the 
 
 
39 Hugo Adam Bedau, Classification-Based Sentencing: Some Conceptual and Ethical 
Problems, in [XXVII: CRIMINAL JUSTICE] NOMOS 89, 102 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. 
Chapman eds., 1985). 
40    Id. 
41    IMMANUEL   KANT, THE   METAPHYSICAL   ELEMENTS   OF   JUSTICE:  PART   I  OF   THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 100-03 (John Ladd trans., 1965) (1797). 
42    Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST  475, 477 (1968), reprinted in 
PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 74, 75-76 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed., 3d ed. 1985). 
43    Id. at 477. 
44    Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms vs. Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 
U.C.L.A L. REV. 1659, 1663 (1992). 
45    Id. at 1665. 
46    Morris, supra note 42, at 477. 
47   ANDREW   VON   HIRSCH,  DOING   JUSTICE   51  (1976);  JOEL   FEINBERG,  DOING   AND 
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 103 (1970). 
48    Michael Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 820 
(2007). 
49    Id. at 830-31. 
50    MOORE, supra note 38, at 732-34. 
51    Cahill, supra note 48, at 828. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss4/6
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criminal justice system should maximize retribution while tending to other needs, 
such as budgetary restrictions. 
Deterrence, a different rationale for criminal punishment, provides at least a 
theoretical basis for decisions and priorities driven by a limited budget and other 
concerns. Deterrence suggests that criminal actions are justified because they prevent 
future harms by imposing costs on illegal conduct.52 Unlike retributivism, deterrence 
focuses on the consequences of prosecution rather than moral imperatives.53 Thus, 
scholars argue that deterrence pushes policy makers and prosecutors to minimize 
social harm.54 Criminal sanctions are valuable not because they impose punishment 
on the individual wrongdoer, but because they send a message to others. They 
impose a cost, which will presumably change the calculus of those contemplating 
similar anti-social acts in the future. 
Deterrence provides greater guidance to policy makers because it involves a 
formula, albeit a difficult one to calculate. Society ought to expend resources and 
calibrate punishments so as to produce the greatest social value. Expending 
resources on the investigation and prosecution of some crimes rather than others will 
inevitably produce more value.55 
In addition to retribution and deterrence, criminal sanctions can serve to reinforce 
and communicate core values.56 Like deterrence, the expressive function of the 
criminal law focuses on consequences of criminalization. Rather than calculating the 
social costs of wrongful acts, however, it measures the importance of social meaning 
and context.57 One of the important functions of the criminal justice system is 
communicating and reinforcing shared social values.58 Émile Durkeim argued that 
the penal system reinforces social solidarity by recognizing and broadcasting shared 
moral values.59 Law-abiding citizens experience the exercise of criminal sanctions as 
a validation and formulation of their social role—the bonds that tie them together.60 
Those inclined to break the law may be immune to this social meaning but will 
nonetheless be deterred from future bad acts.61  Of course, given the diversity of 
 
 
52    Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV 413, 425 (1999) 
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53    Id. at 427. 
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56    Id. at 420-25. For a discussion of the theories of criminal punishment, see generally 
DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY (1996). 
57    Kahan, Secret Ambition, supra note 52, at 419-20. 
58    FEINBERG, supra note 47, at 100; Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions 
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 604 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan, Alternative Sanctions]. 
59 EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 102-03, 105 (1933). Many have 
criticized Durkheim for his overly rosy view of social solidarity or “common consciousness.” 
Most prominently, Michel Foucault developed an alternate view of punishment in which is 
both projects moral values of some and disciplines or forces others into compliance. MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 89-90, 194 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979). 
60    DURKHEIM, supra note 59, at 102. 
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moral views, criminal law can also be a site of conflict and hegemonic proclamations 
about these norms.62 
Scholars of transitional justice have emphasized this communicative value in 
arguing that retribution alone is a poor rationale for criminal prosecutions.63 In most 
fledgling democracies, prosecuting everyone involved in human rights violations 
during a previous repressive regime is impossible. Doing so might undermine the 
strength and durability of the new government. Therefore, these scholars suggest that 
it is appropriate and necessary to single out some individuals for prosecution. In a 
democratic system, this approach broadcasts the values central to the new regime 
while simultaneously strengthening faith in the rule of law without toppling the 
precarious new democracy. 
C. International Law 
This Article draws on international law because, unlike scholars of domestic 
criminal law, international law scholars have thought deeply about the duty to charge 
individuals for criminal wrongdoing. In addition, given the frequency of police 
shootings of African-American men in the United States, police use of force shares 
some similarities with the human rights abuses that invite the attention of 
international law scholars. By drawing the parallel, however, this Article does not 
intend to make an equivalence. The atrocity of human rights violations in the 
Americas and elsewhere are incomparable both in brutality and scale to police 
shootings. The comparison is nonetheless useful. 
David Luban has defined crimes against humanity as crimes that undermine the 
social and political nature of humankind.64 People are naturally social creatures, but 
they need political organization in order to live together.65 Crimes against humanity 
are, in Luban’s terms, politics turned “cancerous.”66 The complete failure to 
prosecute is a social pathology that threatens the system itself.67 While the scope and 
severity of police shootings of unarmed black men are not on the same scale as most 
international human rights violations, they also implicate our political organization. 
As they  mount in number, they reflect a degeneration of the political world.68 
Professor Luban also notes that crimes against humanity tend to target individuals 
within a group precisely for their membership in that group.69 Police shootings may 
be  less  consciously  designed  to  terrorize  a  minority  than  many  human  rights 
 
 
 
62    Kahan, Secret Ambition, supra note 52, at 421. 
63 David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of 
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violations, but that is the effect.70 While police shootings lack the scope and savagery 
typical of crimes against humanity, they share many of the other features.71 Part of 
the horror of human rights abuses is the impunity: the fact that the government 
tortured and abused citizens without accountability.72 Ironically, the very fact that 
police shootings have gone unpunished creates a similarity to these international 
atrocities. 
The theoretical question of whether there ought to be a duty to charge for human 
rights violations has preoccupied international law scholars. While scholars tend to 
disagree about the scope of the duty to charge, most argue that some form of justice 
and revelation of the truth about past crimes is essential to promote reconciliation 
and reinforce democratic values.73 Diane Orentlicher, for instance, argues that there 
is an absolute duty to prosecute human rights violations of a prior regime.74 She 
reasons that a regime that fails to prosecute undermines the authority of the law and 
jeopardizes the transition to democracy.75 But drawing on retributive theories of 
justice, she also argues that atrocious crimes must be punished, especially those that 
single out racial, ethnic, or religious groups.76 Victims and others in society enjoy a 
right to accountability.77 Her view of the critical role criminal justice plays in 
building a democracy echoes the philosophy of the trials at Nuremburg where the 
highly publicized cases provided a public condemnation of the evils of Nazi 
Germany.78 
Most scholars, however, argue for a more pragmatic approach, combining 
prosecutions with other mechanisms to help establish and affirm social norms. Jaime 
Malamud-Goti asserts that democratic governments are required to proceed against 
perpetrators of mass atrocities even at the risk of military rebellion but the failure to 
punish all wrongdoers is not a breach of moral duty.79 Law is not merely a set of 
rules.80 It is a vehicle for social change.81 Deeply embedded, determined, and in turn 
 
 
 
70    TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 81 (2015). 
71 Luban, A Theory, supra note 64, at 98-99 (arguing that crimes against humanity are 
characterized by an ugliness, state-sponsorship, which makes them categorically worse than 
ordinary crimes). 
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74 Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J. 2537, 2540 (1991). 
75    Id. at 2543. 
76    Id. at 2594. 
77    Id. at 2580, 2613-14. 
78 Kristin Bohl, Breaking the Rules of Transitional Justice, 24 WISC. INT’L L. REV. 557, 
558-59 n.8 (2006). 
79 Jaime Malamud-Goti, Transition Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State 
Criminals?, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 5 (1990). 
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11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
514 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:503 
 
 
transformative, law itself plays an important role in the transition from totalitarian 
regimes to democratic governments.82 
Some international law scholars argue that the rule of law requires prosecutions 
of prior regime abuses. For a set of complex reasons, full accountability is often 
impossible.83 Evidence is lost.84 The victims are dead or were so deeply incapacitated 
that they cannot recall details of their torture.85 Those most responsible insulated 
themselves from detection by issuing orders and never directly participating in the 
atrocities.86 
Even when the evidence does exist, it is often hard to judge individuals for 
embracing what was, at the time, the prevalent norm.87 Individual perpetrators may 
have been following orders. They may have feared for their own lives if they did not. 
In Argentina, for example, the new democratic regime had to struggle with a law that 
provided a legal excuse for those who committed crimes because they were ordered 
to do so by superiors in the government or military.88 Police in America share the 
racism that is endemic to our country. As scholars have pointed out, the criminal 
charges incorporate that racism by asking jurors to determine whether or not the 
police officer was reasonably afraid for his or her own safety—a doctrine whose 
meaning depends on social stereotypes about black men.89 
Even if the new regime finds a way (and many have) to bring criminal cases 
against individuals, trials are not always ideal for memorializing complex events.90 
Rules of evidence, burdens of proof, and other procedural restrictions can undermine 
or mangle the truth in ways that break the narrative and make reconciliation more 
difficult. In guilty pleas and trials, unlike in truth commissions, defendants have 
incentives to deny the truth and undermine the credibility of the victim.91 If the 
defendant pleads guilty, then the victim and witnesses do not have the chance to 
recount their story. 
International law scholarship offers insight into the problem of police shootings. 
The parallel shows how vital it is to enforce particular kinds of criminal laws. It 
highlights the structural cost to the democratic system of failing to do so. Police use 
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of unreasonable force against African-Americans qualifies as this type of crime 
because the failure to prosecute implicates fundamental democratic values. The 
failure to prosecute undermines the legitimacy and durability of our system as a 
whole. The scholarly debate about the role of criminal law enforcement in nascent 
democracies gives perspective on the potential role of the law, particularly of 
criminal trials, in the United States. Citizens crave retribution after periods of mass 
atrocity, but most scholars argue for a different justification for criminal law 
enforcement. Criminal justice may satisfy the desire and moral imperative of 
retribution, but most international law scholars agree that the law is more effective in 
communicating and inculcating a new set of values. Domestic criminal law has an 
important role to play in beginning to distance the country from its racist past, 
disentangling criminal law enforcement from its role in maintaining white 
supremacy. 
III. HOW TO HANDLE THE CASE? 
Failing to prosecute police for using unreasonable force against African- 
Americans has a corrosive effect on democracy. It deepens a distrust that has been 
breeding for generations.92 As many scholars and activists have argued, the 
American criminal justice system was born and nurtured on racism.93 It has remained 
a tool of racial domination while retaining the legitimating semblance of a color- 
blind system.94 Like regimes in transition from repressive totalitarianism to 
democracy, our own system needs to shed the past. While, of course, this cannot be 
done in an instant, one step toward embracing a new set of values must involve 
prosecution of police brutality. High-profile cases can serve to both embrace and 
broadcast new values. The dysfunction in our system can, ironically, provide an 
opportunity to disavow the past and begin to introduce new values for the future. 
Taking this progress as the goal, it seems clear that there ought to be a limited 
duty to charge in police shooting cases. Prosecuting police for excessive use of force 
is difficult.95 Cases are often hard to prove.96 Prosecutors are often reluctant to 
charge police because the prosecutors work closely with the department and rely on 
officers to bring cases.97 Even when it seems as if the proof is readily available and 
prosecutors do pursue the case, juries often fail to convict.98 As with human rights 
abuses under totalitarian regimes, it is complicated to impose a new set of norms on 
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actors who were operating in an unjust system. The law governing use of force is 
unclear.99 Racist perceptions can fuel excuses for justification, which juries may 
endorse.100 To charge and prosecute every alleged case would not only be unjust, but 
could potentially compound the problem. The acquittals and dropped charges in the 
Freddie Gray case, for instance, did not transmit a message about racial equality and 
the criminal justice system.101 In fact, it transmitted quite the opposite message. 
It would be an abuse of discretion to fail to prosecute a police officer for shooting 
an unarmed black man if there is sufficient evidence to support the charge. 
Prosecutors have a duty to do justice.102 Given the history of race and the criminal 
justice system—as well as the impact the failure to prosecute has had on African- 
American communities in particular and the criminal justice system in general— 
failure to charge in these sorts of cases amounts to an abdication of that duty.103 Of 
course, even this new obligation leaves prosecutors in charge of determining whether 
sufficient evidence exists, but it imposes an additional burden on them in this class 
of cases. The duty implies an obligation to investigate.104 It would be insufficient to 
conclude that a police shooting does not warrant charges unless the prosecutor has 
thoroughly investigated the case and determined that there is insufficient evidence to 
support criminal charges.105 In other words, a prosecutor must investigate even when 
doing so would alienate the police department on which the prosecutor depends.106 
Criminal prosecutions ought to serve a salutary function. Just as in the 
international context, these trials should expose racial injustice and bias in criminal 
law enforcement. The first step to purging racism is to admit in a public way that it 
exists. Ideally, a public trial can educate the populace and reinforce or even help 
forge new national values.107 While victims and activists seek retribution, the desire 
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for punishment is only a partial purpose of the criminal justice system. In addition, 
as international scholars have demonstrated, part of the purpose of the law in 
transitional moments is to reinforce a new set of values. Public prosecutions of 
police who can be proved guilty of using excessive force against African-Americans 
will offer a counter-narrative. If the criminal justice system in America tends to tell 
the story of dangerous black men plaguing society with brutal crimes, the 
prosecution of the police can offer a new narrative, just as the innocence movement 
has.108 
Even if prosecutors were to charge every police shooting that the evidence 
supports, there are limits to the criminal law’s capacity to serve an expressive 
function. Trials can be a valuable tool for articulating shared values, but they are 
often inadequate. State and federal governments should look to supplement these 
trials with a domestic version of “truth commissions.”109 As international law 
scholars have argued, these arenas offer a cathartic experience for victims while 
involving the entire community in a reevaluation of beliefs and core values.110 A 
limited duty to prosecute should accommodate alternate mechanisms like truth 
commissions, which have proved effective in instilling new values.111 They have the 
benefit of allowing a full narrative, which exceeds the scope of a criminal trial. 
Legislative hearings might serve this function on a smaller scale. In this setting, 
victims and activists could speak without the constraints of evidentiary rules. 
Moreover, police could participate without the fear of criminal punishment. This 
type of dialog is a necessary complement to prosecution in moving away from the 
racial injustice that has marred the criminal justice system and jeopardized the 
foundations of democracy. If the limited duty to prosecute in police use-of-force 
cases is seen as animated by a desire to deter criminal acts and create a new 
narrative, then it is consistent with other mechanisms, like truth commissions.112 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The duty to charge in police shooting cases derives from the expressive and 
deterrent value of criminal law. It is not, therefore, absolute. Unlike retributivism, 
these criminal justice theories cannot support a duty to charge every case. They do, 
however, point to the severe need to address this type of crime. They call on the 
criminal justice system to view this crime, which implicates the foundation of 
democracy, differently. Thus, there is an absolute duty to investigate police killings 
of unarmed black men, and there is a limited duty to charge when the evidence 
supports conviction. 
 
 
 
Q.  1,  17  (1990)  (“[C]riminal  trials  are  and  are  intended  to  be  richly  symbolic  and 
educational—that is part of their function in a society governed by the rule of law.”). 
108    Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 51, 52-53 (forthcoming 2017). 
109    See HAYNER, supra note 85 at 29; Ruth G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 
HARV. HUMAN RTS. J. 69, 79-80 (2003) [hereinafter Teitel, Genealogy]. 
110    Teitel, Genealogy, supra note 109, at 80. 
111    Teitel, Transitional Justice, supra note 67, at 404. 
112    Id. 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
